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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code 78-2-2(3 )(a) this civil appeal is within the jurisdiction of
the Utah Supreme Court and was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
This is the consolidation of two separate appeals: (a) one filed by Fox challenging
the granting of the summary judgment in favor of Porter, and (b) another filed by Porter
challenging the summary judgment dismissing Porter's claims against National based
upon a Statute of Limitation and not holding that Rule 15(c) allowed relation back of an
amended complaint to the date of the filing of the original complaint, and then the
awarding of attorney's fees to National without apportioning between work done for Fox
as opposed to work done for National. Fox is designated the Appellant. Porter is the
Appellee and Cross-Appellant. National is the Cross-Appellee on Porter's "Cross"
Appeal.
Fox's Statement of Issues on Appeal Fails to Comply with U.RApp.P. Rule
24(a)(5). Rule 24(a)(5) requires the statement of issues on appeal to cite to the record
where the issue was preserved for appeal, and also requires an identification of the
applicable standard of review for each issue. Fox has failed to satisfy either of these
requirements. Its brief is procedurally deficient in this regard and should be stricken.

1

Porter's Statement of Issues Which are On Appeal.
1.

Was Judge Bohlmg Correct in Ruling that Fox's Memorandum in Support of the

Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Failed to Comply with the
Requirements of Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 ? Preserved for Appeal in
Porter's Reply Memorandum in Support of'Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 614- 654;
and in oral argument at the hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 11,
2002 R. 1261; and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for

summaiy

judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Wells v.
Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994). A trial court's ruling enforcing the
requirements of CJA 4-501 shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. ("In
addition, the trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with Rule 4-501. See
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (upholding
trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept supplemental memoranda outside
bounds of rule 4-501) Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339 (Ut App 2003)
2.

Was Judge Bohlmg Correct in Ruling that Fox's Memorandum in Support of the

Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Failed to Properly Dispute
Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts 9

Presented for Appeal in Porter *s Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 614- 654: and in oral
i

argument at the hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 11, 2002 R. 1261;
and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April
29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact
under the clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness
standard. With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying
facts under the deferential clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is
within the province of the appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower]
court's resolution of such questions of law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998)
3.

Was it reversible error for Judge Bohling to conclude that Porter's Amended Complaint

raising claims against National did not relate back to the date of the filing of the original
Complaint under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? Presented for Appeal in
Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp }s Motion for Summary
Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for
summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential
clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of
law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998)

3

4.

Was it reversible error for Judge Bohlmg to fail to find that the actions of Fox and the

State of Utah to conceal the identity of the bond company tolled the statute of limitations?
Preserved for Appeal in Porier 's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety
Corp s Motion for Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second
hearing on the motion for summcuy judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential
clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of
law/1 McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998)
5.

Were their issues of fact as to whether Porter's actions in attempting to learn the identity

of the bond company were reasonable which should have precluded the granting of summary
judgment in favor of National? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral
argument at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002
R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings
for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277
(Utah 1998); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998;.
"We consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly

4

concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Servs., 970
P.2dat 1277.
6.

Were their factual issues as to whether there were "exceptional circumstances that

rendered the application of the statute of limitations unjust" which should have precluded
granting summary judgment in favor of National? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summary?
Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for
summary judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for
correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah
1998); Certified Stir. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Servs., 970 P.2d at 1277.
7.

Were their issues of fact as to the closeness of the relationship between Fox and National,

and whether and how much National knew about Porter's claims and lawsuit, which should have
precluded granting summary judgment in favor of National? Preserved for Appeal in Porter's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summary
Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion for
summary judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59.
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for
correctness. Aurora Credit Sen's., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah

5

1998); CerufiedSur. Group, Lid. v. UTJnc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Crcdu Sen's., 970 P.2d at 1277.
8.

Was it error for Judge Bohling to conclude that simply because the relationship between

Fox and National was one of privity of contract, there could not be a sufficient closeness of
relationship or identity of interest to warrant relation back under Rule 15(c)? Preserved for
Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for
Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral argument at the second hearing on the motion
for summaiy judgment on April 29, 2002 R. 1262:27-59; and in Porter's Motion for
Relief from Summaiy Judgment, Memorandum in Support thereof and Reply
Memorandum R. 926-945, 946-47, 1070-1076; and in the oral argument on said Motion
for Relief from Summaiy Judgment on October 22, 2002 R. 1263.
Standard of Review: "...[W]e review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for
correctness. Aurora Credit Sews., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah
1998); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc, 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). "We consider
only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
issues of material fact existed." Aurora Credit Sen's., 970 P.2d at 1277.
9.

Was it reversible error for the Court, pursuant to the Motion for Relief from Summaiy

Judgment, to fail to hold (a) that there is always a close-enough relationship between a contractor
and its surety to allow relation back, (b) that based upon the admissions of Floyd Cox presented
to the Court, there was a sufficiently close relationship between Fox and its Surety to allow
relation back, and/or (c) the issue of closeness of Fox and its Surety was at least disputed and
6

should have been determined by the trier of fact before the Court concluded that there should be
no relationship back?

Preserved for Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant National Surety Corp 3s Motion for Summary Judgment R. 238-338, and in oral
argument

at the second hearing on the motion for summaiy judgment

R. 1262:27-59; and in Porter's Motion for Relief from Summaiy
in Support thereof and Reply Memorandum
oral argument

on April 29, 2002

Judgment,

Memorandum

R. 926-945, 946-47, 1070-1076; and in the

on said Motion for Relief from Summaiy

Judgment

on October 22, 2002 R.

1263.
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect
to mixed questions of law and fact, we will review the underlying facts under the deferential
clear error standard; however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of
law." McKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998)
10.

Was it reversible error for the Court to grant all of the fees requested by National's

attorney's - even those incurred in defending Fox and not necessarily National? Preserved for
Appeal in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees R. 895-901; and in the oral argument thereon at the hearing on
October 22, 2002 R. 1263.
Standard of Review: "...this court will review the lower court's findings of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a correctness standard. With respect

7

to mixed questions of law and fact, wc will review the underlying facts under the deferential
clear error standard: however, the legal effect of those facts is within the province of the
appellate court, and no deference need be given a [lower] court's resolution of such questions of
law."Mr/un v. Harch\ 973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998)
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Fox's Brief Again Failed to Comply with U.R. App. P. Rule 24. Rule 24(a)(6)
requires an appellant to set forth in his brief verbatim any and all detemiinative
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, mles and/or regulations. Fox's Appellant's
Brief fails to do so, and should be stricken for non-compliance with the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Determinative Rules. The following Rules are detemiinative:
U.R.Ch.P, Rule 15(c)
u

(c) Relation hack of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to e set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading."

U.R.Civ.P, Rule 56(c)
"(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, maybe rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." (Emphasis added)

8

ILR.Civ.P, Rule 56(e)
"(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. ... When a motion for summary
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him." (Emphasis added)
CJA 4-501(2)(B)
"(B) Memorandum in opposition to the motion. The points and authorities in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party
contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts which
support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the opposing party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing party's statement." (Emphasis added)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the Fall of 1997, Porter and Defendant Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") entered
into a written subcontract agreement for the construction of the University of Utah's
Women's Gymnastic Training Center, wherein Porter was to provide specific work
identified in the Subcontract - only those specific sections cited therein - for a total
lump sum of $146,740.00, excluding any change orders. In October, 1997 Porter began
performing the work required of it under the terms and scope of the parties' written
agreement.
9

Soon after Porter began its work, Fox. through its supervisors and project manager
Jeff Wood, began requesting that Porter perform additional work thai was clearly
outside the scope of the parties' written subcontract. Porter continued to perfonii the
work required of it under the parties' written agreement and also performed the
additional work requested by Fox.
In connection with all the work Porter was providing to the Project, it invoiced Fox
approximately once a month, identifying by line item the work it had performed
subsequent to the last invoice and the cost associated with each line item of work.
Initially, Fox paid Porter for all the work it was providing, both inside and outside
the scope of the parties' original written agreement. But within a few months, Fox
stopped paying Porter according to the invoices submitted, and instead began falsely
claiming that all the work being performed was under the parties' written agreement.
Over the duration of the Project, Porter continued to perfonii all work required
under the parties5 written agreement plus the additional work outside the scope of the
written contract as requested by Fox, all the while attempting to negotiate with Fox and
collect the amounts billed in Porter's invoices. Occasionally, Fox would admit that it
owed Porter for the additional work and pay Porter accordingly. But, by the end of
Porter's involvement on the Project, Fox ultimately refused to pay Porter for all the work
that Porter had performed. Fox refused to pay the amounts still due under the parties'
written agreement and refused to pay the amounts still due for the additional work outside

10

the scope of the written agreement that Porter performed at the request of Fox. The
difference in the value of the work preformed by Porter and the amount paid by Fox was
in excess of $160,000.00. As a result Porter was forced to initiate this lawsuit.
Porter performed its last work on or about May 16, 1999. Gary Porter and his son,
Mark Porter, contacted Fox and the State of Utah numerous times to try to leam the
identity of Fox's bonding company. Porter's attorney also made numerous attempts to
get this infonnation. It is undisputed that Porter made all of these attempts to get the
bond information. It is also undisputed that neither Fox nor the State of Utah ever gave
any bonding infonnation to Porter. From Porter's affidavits, it appears that Fox and the
State deliberately withheld this infonnation from Porter.
Porter filed his original complaint herein on or about Mary 16, 2000 without
naming the bond company National because Porter had been wholly thwarted in its
attempts to leam the identity of National. Fox's initial Rule 26(a) disclosures also did not
disclose the bonding infonnation. It was not until after the one year statute of limitations
for suing bonding companies was believed by Fox to have expired that Fox finally gave
Porter the name of its bonding company.
Porter filed a motion to amend to add National as a party, and to assert a claim on
the bond. Fox's and National's attorneys did not oppose this motion to amend. Judge
Bohling granted the motion to amend on February 28, 2001. Porter filed his amended
complaint naming National on March 14, 2001. There is an issue of whether this waived
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the statute of limitations claim/defense.
National filed its motion for summary judgment, raising a statute of limitations
defense. Porter opposed the motion, alleging that under Rule 15(c) the amended
complaint should relate back and was therefore timely, that the discovery rule tolled the
statute, that Fox and National had deliberately withheld the bonding information from
Porter, and that extraordinary factors otherwise favored a refusal to enforce the statute of
limitations.
Porter filed its own motion for summary judgment for the monies due. In Porter's
memorandum, Porter set forth in sixty-five (65) separate paragraphs a very detailed
statement of undisputed facts supporting Porter's claims. The record submitted with the
motion was over an inch think. Fox filed an "Objection" to the motion for summary
judgment, and a Memorandum in Support of this Objection (collectively "Objection").
This opposing memorandum did not comply with CJA 4-501(2)(B) in that (a) it did not
set forth verbatim all of Porter's statements of undisputed fact which Fox alleged were in
dispute, and (b) it did not set forth next to each of said undisputed facts any facts
supported by citations to the record which Fox believed disputed each of Porter's facts.
Rather. Fox merely said that it "admitted" or "denied" Porter's facts number by number,
with no evidentiary back up for the denials whatsoever. Fox then set forth certain
"additional" disputed facts which did have citations to the record, but none of which
were cross-referenced to Porter's statements of undisputed fact.
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Porter filed a motion to strike this Objection because it was too late. Porter also
filed a motion to strike the "additional" disputed facts on the grounds that these supposed
"facts'" were without proper foundation or other evidentiary support. For instance, Floyd
Cox tried to testify about matters which were only discussed, if at all, between Gary
Porter and Fox's foreman, Jeff Wood.
A hearing was held on these motions on April 29, 2002. After hearing argument
on National's motion for summary judgment, Judge Bohling Riled that Porter's efforts to
learn the identity of Fox's bonding company had not been diligent enough, that Porter
knew that it likely had a bond claim and should have some how tried harder to learn the
identify of the bonding company. Judge Bohling also ruled that since the relationship
between Fox and National was only one of "privity of contract," Rule 15(c) would not
allow relation back. Consequently, Judge Bohling granted National's Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismissed Porter's claims against National.
With respect to Porter's claims against Fox, Judge Bohling heard long and detailed
argument as to (a) why Fox's Objection was deficient under CJA 4-501 (2)(B) and that
Porter's statement of undisputed fact should be deemed admitted, and (b) why Fox's
Objection nevertheless did not in reality dispute Porter's statement of undisputed fact.
Judge Bohling took a fairly lengthy recess from the bench to consider these arguments.
When Judge Bohling returned to the bench, he announced that:
"I've had a chance to give considerable consideration to this motion brought here
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by Portei. Theie is the issue that was raised fairly b) Porta that the defendant's
mcmoiandum was untimely It w as untimely by a considerable period of time, yet the
Court felt m the mteiest of justice that it should properly considei that memorandum.
But hc\\ mg done so, the Court also believes that it should give a ver} high level of
scrutiny to that memo and the requirements of Rule 4-501 subparagraph ... (2)(b). I'\ e
done so, and its my view that the issues of fact that are being raised by the defendant,
Fox, simply don't raise genuine issues of disputed fact, given the standards I have [to]
apply undei 4-501(2)(c), and I believe that summary judgment should appropriately be
granted.
I don't even — I don't' find m those undisputed facts an issue of fact on [section]
2300. There was an articulate argument made as to why there should be an issue of fact,
but I don't find it m the memorandum, and it seems to me that the issues o f - the
assertions that have been made here by the plaintiff I asked to these various matters are
appiopnately submitted to the Court without dispute and [the motion for summary
judgment] should be granted." R 1262, pp 58 - 59.
Both parties later filed motions to set aside these rulings. Porter filed his motion
based upon the then just announced Nunez v Albo, 53 P. 3d 2 (UT App 2002) decision
(which allow ed relation back for parties with only a privity of contract relationshipjand
certain factual admissions/testimony obtained from Fox m a supplemental proceeding to
the effect that Fox and National had an extiemel) close financial relationship and identity
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of interest. Fox filed its motion to set aside based upon certain new affidavits of Floyd
and Nellyn Cox (principals of Fox). Porter moved to strike these affidavits because they
were still without foundation. Neither of the Coxes were involved in the negotiation of
the Porter Subcontract, or the supervision of Porter's work. Neither of the Coxes are
competent to testify about the matters that they attempted to raise in their new affidavits.
Both parties requested an award of attorney's fees.
A hearing was held on October 22, 2002. After argument, Judge Bohling denied
both motions to set aside the summary judgments. In denying Porter's motion to set
aside, Judge Bohling continued to rule that a privity of contract relationship simply cannot
as a matter of law be close enough to allow relation back, despite the holding in Nunez.
Judge Bohling also granted National almost all of the fees that it requested,
without making any allocations for work performed on behalf of Fox and not National.
Fox appealed the summary judgment in favor of Porter and against it.
Porter appealed the summary judgment in favor of National, and the award of
attorney's fees to National.
The appeals were consolidated, and Fox has filed its Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") entered into a general contract with the
University of Utah ("University") for the construction of the Women's Gymnastics
Training Facility on the University's campus in Salt Lake City, Utah, (the
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"Project") Fox's contract with the owner provides that Fox will "furnish labor,
materials and equipment to complete the work as required m the Contract
Documents . . ." Contract documents include the specifications found in the
Project Manual. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 1 in P oner's Memorandum
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R. 396 - 552,
2.

in

397

In connection with the Project, Fox and Defendant National Surety Corporation
("National") issued a Payment Bond for the benefit of persons supplying labor,
equipment and material in connection with the Project. Statement of Undisputed
Fact No. 2 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy

Judgment

R. 396-552, 398
3.

Fox entered into a written subcontract with Plaintiff Porter & Sons ("Porter"),
under which Porter was to "furnish and install all materials, equipment and labor
per plans, specification sections 02000, 02070, 02230, 02601, 02680, 02700 and
02721 and addendums 1 and 2" for the sum of $146, 740.00. Statement of
Undisputed Fact No. 3 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398 ( See Copy of Written Subcontract

attached

to said Memorandum as Exhibit C, at R. 423)
4.

This written subcontract excluded any change orders, and has an integration
clause. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 4 in Porter's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398
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5.

Fox's Project Manager, Jeff Wood prepared the written subcontract between Fox
and Porter. Statement ofUndisputed Fact No. 5 in Porter's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398.

6.

Porter performed all required work under the written Subcontract. Statement of
Undisputed Fact No. 6 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398

7.

Fox has admitted that Porter performed all the work identified in specification
sections 02230, 02700, and 02721 of the written Subcontract. Statement of
Undisputed Fact No. 7 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 398-99

8.

Specification section 02680 was mistakenly included in Porter's scope of work
under the written Subcontract and pursuant to an oral agreement between Porter
and Fox, Porter was instructed not provide any labor, equipment or materials
covered under that specification section. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 8 in
Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552,
399

9.

In addition to the work performed under the written Subcontract, Porter was
requested by Fox to perform additional work outside the scope of the written
Subcontract. This included work under specification sections 02300 (Earthwork),
02665 (Water Lines, Valves and Appurtenances) and 02711 (Foundation Drainage
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Systems). The work performed by Porter under these sections was clearly outside
the scope of the written subcontract and required the payment of additional
compensation to Porter. Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 9 in Porter's
Memorandum in Support of Morion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 399
10.

As Porter performed all the work required under the written Subcontract and the
additional work requested by Fox, it invoiced Fox for such work, identifying line
item by line item, the work performed and the associated cost for the work.
Statement of Undisputed Fact No. 10 in Porrer 's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 399

11.

Fox admitted that it received and reviewed all the invoices submitted by Porter.
Statement of Undisputed Facr No. 11 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 5525 399

12.

Jeff Wood admitted that on several occasions he and Gary Porter discussed
Porter's invoices and went through them line item by line item to make sure that
Fox was properly paying Porter for the work Porter had done. Statement of
Undisputed Fact No. 12 in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summaiy Judgment R. 396 - 552, 399

13.

From November 1, 1997 and thereafter, Porter perfoniied work withm the scope of
the Subcontract, and additional work outside of the scope of the Subcontract, and
billed Fox for this work. Fox paid Porter for a large part of this work, all as set
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forth m excruciating detail in Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, R. 396 - 552, statements of undisputed facts 13-65, R. 400 409.
14.

Fox ceased paying Porter on Porter's invoices. Affidavit of Gary Porter, Exhibit Q
to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summaiy Judgment. R. 532

15.

Porter last provided labor, equipment and/or materials on the Project on or about
May 16, 1999. Statement of Fact No. 2 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for Summaiy Judgment

R 238-338,

239
16.

Over the course of Porter's involvement on the Project, Porter and Fox had many
disagreements over payment for work performed by Porter in connection with the
Project. Statement of Fact No. 3 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summaiy Judgment

R 23 8-338,

239
17.

Prior to Porter sending a letter to the University of Utah wherein he requested
Fox's Payment Bond information, Gary Porter spoke with Jeff Wood, Fox's
Project Manager, and requested that Fox provide its Payment Bond information to
Porter. Jeff Wood refused to provide the Payment Bond information, including
whether a Payment Bond even existed.

Statement of Fact No. 4 in Porter's

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for
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Summary Judgment
18.

R 238-338, 239

Porter then prepared and sent a letter to the Owner of the Project requesting that it
provide Porter with Fox's Payment Bond information. This letter was also mailed
to Fox. Statement of Fact No. 5 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for Summaiy Judgment

R 238-338,

239
19.

The owner received Porter's letter requesting the Payment Bond. In response the
owner requested via e-mail, that the Project's architect speak with Fox's Floyd
Cox and Jeff Wood about the matter prior to the owner releasing the Payment
Bond information to Porter. See Statement of Fact No. 6 in Porter's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for
Summaiy Judgment

20.

R 238-338, 239

Neither Fox nor the owner of the Project provided Porter with any infoiination
relating to the Fox's Payment Bond. Statement of Fact No. 7 in Porter's
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp 's Motion for
Summaiy Judgment

21.

R 238-338, 239

Due to Fox's and the owner's failure to provide the Payment Bond information,
Mark Porter spoke with Fox's Project Manager, Jeff Wood and requested the
Payment Bond infoiination. Mr. Wood again refused to provide the infoiination to
Mark Porter. Mark Porter also made numerous telephone calls to Fox's office
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seeking to obtain the Payment Bond information. Fox failed to return any of Mark
Porter's messages.

Statement of Fact No. 8 in Porter's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant National Surety Corp's Motion for Summaiy

Judgment

R 238-338, 239
22.

During the early part of June, 1999, attorney Brian W. Steffensen attempted to
contact Tom Christiansen of Campus Constmction and Design, the identified
Owner of Utah Women's Gymnastic's Training Center Constmction Project to try
to find out if Fox had posted a bond. Over a period of several weeks, Steffensen
left 3 or 4 telephone messages with an individual which Steffensen understood to
be a secretary or receptionist, requesting that she ask Mr. Christiansen to contact
Steffensen if there was a bond in connection with the Project. R. 606-07

23.

As a result of Steffensen's several conversations with this woman, Steffensen
understood that she or Mr. Christiansen would get back to Steffensen if there was
in fact a bond posted by Fox. When she did not get back to Steffensen, he
understood and therefore assumed that it was because there was no bond. R. 607

24.

Unaware of the existence of a Payment Bond, Porter filed suit against Fox on
March 16, 2000. Thereafter, Fox continued its efforts to conceal the existence of
the Payment Bond when it prepared and submitted to Porter its Rule 26 initial
disclosures, stating that their was no insurance agreement at issue in the case.
Only through discussions between the parties' counsel was Porter finally provided
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a cop}' of the applicable Payment Bond. This information was not provided to
Porter until after the applicable statute of limitations had run.

Stat cm em of Fact

No. 9 in Porter's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety
Corp 's Motion for Summary Judgment
25.

R 238-338, 240-41

Thereafter, Porter filed its Motion to Amend its Complaint to include a claim
against National Surety Corporation as surety on the Payment Bond. Fox's and
National's attorneys did not object to the amendment adding National.
Consequently, Porter's Motion was granted on February 28, 2001. See Minute
Entiy Decision and Order, R. 46-47

26.

National filed its motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds
on or about December 4, 2001. R. 111-162

27.

Porter filed his opposition to National's motion for summary judgment on January
4,2002. R. 238-338

28.

National filed its Reply on January 14, 2003. R. 339-350

29.

Porter filed his motion for summary judgment against Fox on March 18, 2002. R.
396-554

30.

Fox filed its "Objection'1 to Porter's motion for summary judgment on April 8,
2002. R. 563-605

31.

Porter filed a Motion to Strike Fox's Objection to Porter's Motion for Summary
Judgment on April 10, 2002. R. 608 - 613
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32.

Porter filed his Reply in support of his motion for summary judgment on April 10,
2002, plus a motion to strike Fox's Additional Statement of Disputed Facts. R.
614-656

33.

Judge Bohling heard oral argument on both motions on April 29, 2002 (continued
from April 11, 2002), and granted them both. R. 663

34.

On June 6, 2002, Judge Bohling signed the Order Granting Porter Summary
Judgment. R. 667-669

35.

On July 31, 2002, National moved for an award of attorney's fees. R. 839-876

36.

Porter opposed National's request for an award of attorney's fees which included
all work done by the attorney's - even that done for Fox and not National, on
August 12, 2002. R. 895-901

37.

On September 6, 2002, Porter filed his Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment
Granted in Favor of Defendant National Surety Corporation. This motion was
based upon the new Nunez v. Albo, 53 P. 3 (UT App 2002), case, and testimony
acquired from Floyd Cox in a supplemental proceeding to the effect that Fox and
National were very closely related economically and financially. R. 926-947

38.

National opposed Porter's motion for relief from judgment on September 19, 2002.
R. 988-997

39.

Porter filed his Reply in support of his motion for relief from the National
summary judgment on October 2, 2002. R. 1070-1076
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40.

Fox filed a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Porter summary judgment on
October 11,2002. R. 1103-1100

41.

On October 18, 2002, Porter filed his Memorandum in Opposition to Fox's Rule
60(b) Motion for Relief from the Porter summary judgment. R. 1195-1211

42.

Porter also moved to strike the affidavits of Floyd Cox and Nellyn Cox in support
of Fox's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Porter Summary Judgment on
October 18, 2002 on the grounds that said affidavits did not have proper
foundation. Neither of the Coxes were ever first hand participants in any of the
factual occurrences relevant to Porter's work. R. 1212-1216

43.

Judge Bohling heard oral argument on the motions for relief from summary
judgment on October 22, 2002, and denied them both. R. 1224

44.

Judge Bohling also granted National most of the attorney's fees that it requested.
Ibid.

45.

Porter filed its Notice of Appeal on January 3, 2003. R. 1232-1239
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Porter filed its motion for summary judgment after the parties' depositions were

taken because it knew then that Fox could not factually dispute Porter's claims. Porter's
Statement of Undisputed Facts consisted of sixty-five detailed paragraphs - each
supported with multiple citations to the record. It painted a painstaking picture of exactly
what had occurred and how and why Porter was owed the money that it claimed.
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When faced with such a detailed and fully supported motion for summary
judgment, U.R.Civ.P. Rule 56 and CJA 4-501(2)(B) placed a heavy burden upon Fox to
directly and adequately dispute each and every material fact set forth in Porter's statement
of undisputed facts. Fox did not - and in reality could not - dispute Porter's facts. Judge
Bohling was correct when he granted the motion for two reasons: (a) the failure to comply
with CJA 4-501(2)(B) required Judge Bohling to deem Porter's statement of undisputed
fact to be admitted, and (b) substantively Fox's attempt to dispute Porter's facts fell
woefully short. The only thing Fox did was try to claim that section 02300 of the
Project's plans and specifications was mistakenly left out of the contract. But this
assertion was without factual basis in the record. This was one of those unique occasions
where the defendant literally could not - and did not - dispute the material facts.
Summary Judgment against Fox was entirely appropriate.
With respect to National, Porter's argument is simple: Judge Bohling's ruling as a
matter of law that a "privity of contract" relationship is never sufficient to allow an
amendment to relate back is simply incorrect. The Nunez and Penrose cases clearly hold
otherwise. Further, the admissions as to the closeness of the financial relationship and
identity of interest between Fox and National should have ended the discussion and
supported a finding that there was a sufficient identity of interest to allow - nay require relation back. Further, Fox's (and essentially National's) deliberate hiding of the identity
of National should have barred a statute of limitations defense. Finally, the issue of
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whether Porter had been diligent enough in its attempts to determine the name of the
bonding company was factual in nature and should have been left to the jury.
Under facts suggesting deliberate hiding of the name of the bonding company, and
m face of Porter's extensive unsuccessful attempts to learn the identity of National, it was
simply inequitable and unfair to allow the statute of limitations to bar Porter's bond
claims.
Lastly, the Court should have apportioned Babcock's attorney's fees between Fox
and National and not awarded fees for work perfomied primarily on behalf of Fox and not
National.
ARGUMENT
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST FOX WAS FAIR AND JUST IN ALL
RESPECTS AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
Fox Did Not Comply with CJA 4-501(2)08). The requirements of CJA 4501(2)(B) are clear:
"(B) Memorandum in opposition to the motion. The points and authorities in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a verbatim
restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to which the party contends a
genuine issue exists followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the
party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and property
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement." (Emphasis added)
Fox's "Objection" to Porter's Motion was clearly deficient because:
a.

Fox's Objection did not set forth a \ erbathn restatement of each of Porter's
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statements of fact about which Fox asserted there was dispute;
b.

Fox did not follow each verbatim restatement of Porter's statements of undisputed
fact with a concise statement of material facts which support Fox's contention that
the "undisputed" facts were disputed.

Because of these failures, Fox's Objection is a perfect example of exactly what CJA 4501(2)(B) was designed to preclude. Fox's failure to comply forced Judge Bohling to
sift through each and every one of Fox's "additional facts" to try to determine if, how
and/or why each such "additional facts" might some how dispute one or more of Porter's
statements of undisputed fact. This was exactly the problem that the trial court in Fennell
v. Green, 77 P.3d 339 (Ut App 2003) faced when a party failed to comply with CJA 4501.
It is clear that Fennell failed to comply with the rule. He did not refer to
Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead included only his own
statement of undisputed facts. As a result, it was unclear what facts Fennell
contended were disputed." Fennell, at 342. (Emphasis added)
CJA 4-501(2)(B) was designed to assist the Court in determining exactly what the
opposing party considered to be the disputed facts. The Fennell court quoted the Utah
Supreme Court when it reaffirmed the proposition that parties are required to comply with
the Rules of Judicial Administration.
The Utah Supreme Court... recently emphasized the importance of
compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration in Lovendahl v. Jordan
School District, 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705.[fn3] In Lovendahl the plaintiff sued
for damages under a claim for inverse condemnation. See id. at ^ 48. The
defendant's summary judgment motion and supporting memorandum included
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facts and arguments that the plaintiff, in opposing the summar\ judgment motion,
did not address. See icL at ^J 50. The court noted that under rule 4-501 (2)(B)
"all facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are deemed admitted for
the purpose of s u m m a n judgment unless specifically controverted by the
opposing part) fs statement.fM Lovendahl 2002 UT 130 at <]fl[ 50 (quoting Utah R.
Jud.Admm. 4-501 (2)(B)). ...
In addition, the trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with rule 4-501.
See Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701-02 (Utah Ct.App. 1994)
(upholding trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing to accept supplemental
memoranda outside bounds of rule 4-501). Utah courts have repeatedly upheld
the necessity of compliance with the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
See id.; see also Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 902 P.2d 142. 148 (Utah
1995) (determining that failure to comply with rule 4-501 made additional filings
moot); cf. Price v. Ami our, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) (finding trial court
erred m not complying with rule 4-501 but affirming because error was harmless);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175,1fl[ 14, 982 P.2d 586 (reversing trial
court where it did not follow notice requirement of rule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration). See generally Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 497 n. 3
(Utah 1998) (affirming trial court on other grounds but noting plaintiffs response
to motion for summary judgment failed to conform with rule 4-501 because it
failed to set forth disputed facts and did not contain numbered sentences).

Due to Non Compliance with CJA 4-501, Porter's Statement of Undisputed
Facts Became "Deemed Admitted." The last part of CJA 4-501 clearly states that
failure to dispute a statement of undisputed facts properly "shall" result in those
"undisputed facts" being deemed admitted. The Utah Supreme Court so held in
Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130. Judge Bohlmg did not have any discretion to ignore these
requirements. Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts had to be deemed admitted, and
the motion for summary judgment based thereon granted.
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Judge Bohling Reviewed Fox's Objection and Determined that it
Substantively Did Not Dispute Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts. Judge
Bohling was conscientious and did not want to grant summary judgment against Fox
unless the material facts really were not disputed. Judge Bohling clearly went the extra
mile and exhaustively reviewed the parties' memoranda. After that exhaustive review,
Judge Bohling came to the conclusion that Fox had not in fact disputed Porter's Statement
of Undisputed Facts with citations to real, hard admissible evidence. Fox had tried to say
"denied55 to many of the statements, but that clearly is not sufficient without much more.
Judge Bohling5s conclusion was entirely accurate. Fox tried to argue that Floyd
Cox testified in his deposition that the work required under Section 02300 of the plans
and specifications for the project - which Section clearly is not included in the written
subcontract - was mistakenly left out of the subcontract.

That appears to be the main

position that Fox tried to espouse in its Objection. Unfortunately for Fox, the evidence
actually adduced in this case was clear and did not support any such assertion. Cox did
not have personal laiowledge of any of this because he did not negotiate the contract, did
not draft it and did not supervise Porter's work. Fox's foreman - Jeff Wood (who is the
only person who did have personal laiowledge of the relevant facts) - did not so testify in
his deposition. The lack of admissible evidence to dispute Porter's Undisputed Facts led
Judge Bohling to conclude from the bench that although Fox's attorneys had argued
valiantly for the Court to so find, there simply was no evidence set forth in the Objection
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to support such a conclusion. R. 12(>2,k pp. 58-59
Consequently, Judge Holding's Decision to Grant Summary Judgment
Against Fox and in Favor of Porter is Supported by Two Separate and Legally
Sufficient Bases. The order signed by Judge Bohling states that the summary judgment
was granted based upon two separate and legally sufficient reasons. First, the deemed
admitted statements of undisputed fact arising from the operation of 4-501(2)(B); and
Second, the determination that substantively the Objection did not in actuality dispute
Porter's statement of undisputed facts. If this Court of Appeals undertakes the same
exhaustive effort that Judge Bohling did, it will quickly reach the same conclusion.
But it is important to note that Judge Bohling had absolute discretion to require
Fox to comply with CJA 4-501(2)(B), and based upon Fox's failure to so comply, to
deem Porter's statement of undisputed facts to be admitted. These mlings and/or actions
by Judge Bohling are well within the bounds of his discretion and are therefore
unassailable on this appeal.
The Summary Judgment was proper and fair. Porter's marshaling of the evidence
in support of its position as set forth in the statement of undisputed facts was detailed,
comprehensive and compelling. There can be no real doubt but that Porter is in every
way fully entitled to the judgment which was rendered in its favor. It is consistent with
the written subcontract, the admitted changes orders and admitted requests for additional
work. Fox's defense thereto was at all times somewhat desperate and contrived. Fox's
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appeal in these regards should be entirely dismissed and Judge Bohling's corresponding
rulings affirmed.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF NATIONAL SHOULD BE
REVERSED AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ENTERED AGAINST NATIONAL
AND IN FAVOR OF PORTER ON THE BOND
URCivP Rule 15(c) Allows Amendments to Relate Back in Time to the Filing of the
Original Complaint. Porter's last work was on May 16, 1999. Porter filed his origmal
complaint in March of 2000. If the amended complaint adding National were allowed to relate
back, it would have been timely.
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part, that "Whenever
the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading." URCivP 15(c). "Relation back is allowed under the
rules even if a statute of limitations has run during the intervening time." Meyers v. Interwest
Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981). "hi considering motions to amend pleadings, primary
considerations are whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any
party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage." Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah
1981); See also, Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
Generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new
parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings. But, the Utah Supreme Court
has made an exception to the general rule. "The exception operates where there is a relation
back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so
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it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial." Sulzcn v Wilhams,911 P.2d
497, 501 (Utah App. 1009) quoting, Do\n-Lavton Co v. Clark 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976).
li has been further held, that parties have an identity of interest when "the real parties in interest
were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early
stage." Doxer-Lavton Co , 548 P.2d at 906. Cf. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263. 265
(Utah 1995) (noting that identity of interest exists when existing parties and those sought to be
added are so closely related "that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the
action to the other") (citation omitted).
In this case, Porter argued initially in opposition to National's motion for summary
judgment that it is clear that Fox and National have the identity of interest necessary to relate
Porter's Amended Complaint back to the date of its original complaint, hi connection with Fox
becoming the general contractor for the Project, Fox as Principal and National as surety, issued a
Payment Bond for the benefit of persons supplying labor and material in connection with the
Project. According to the Payment Bond, both Defendants are jointly and severally liable. Their
economic fates on this project are entirely identical. They are joined at the economic hip.
However, Judge Bohling granted National's motion, Riling that:
'Tinning first to the relation back doctrine, it is well-established that the filing of
an amended complaint generally will relate back to the date of the filing of the
original complaint only when the amendment does not add a new party. If,
however, a party is added, but the new and old parties are 'so closely related in
their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide
notice of the action to the other/ then an exception applies, and relation back is
allowed. See, Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P. 2d 367 (Utah 1996) at 368;
and Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P. 2d 214 (Utah 1984) at 216. To
determine whether this exception applies here requires an examination of the
relationship between Fox and NSC. The identity of interest between these
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parties, as it turns out, is privity of contract. It is clear, as held in Perry, that
such a relationship is an insufficient identity of interest to allow for relation
back. Id. Thus, plaintiffs action in filing the claim adding NSC as a party does
not relate back to the filing date of the original Complaint under Rule 15."
(Emphasis added) R. 793-94
Judge Bohling's written ruling sets forth all of the case law and principles that
Porter was relying on, but then it suddenly concludes that "privity of contract" equals (or
requires a finding of) "insufficient identity of interest."
The Court based its ruling on its reading of the Utah Supreme Court decision of
Periy v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). In Periy, a third party
plaintiff had subcontracted to furnish doors and millwork on a constmction project. Perry
ordered the doors from the supplier, which then ordered the doors from the manufacturer.
Following suit by the general contractor against Peny for breach of contract arising from
a claim that the doors were defective, Perry filed his third party complaint against the
supplier and manufacturer alleging they had breached their warranties. Id. at 216. Periy's
third party complaint was filed more than five years after the doors were delivered to
Perry. Id.
The trial court in Perry granted the supplier's and manufacturer's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that Perry's claims were barred by the applicable four year statute of limitations.
On appeal, Peny argued that pursuant to U.R.Civ.P. 15(c) his third party complaint should relate
back to the filing of the original complaint. The Utah Supreme Court mled against Peny, finding
that there was no "identity of interest" between the original plaintiff (the general contractor),
Peny (the door subcontractor) and the third party defendants (the door supplier and
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manufacturer). The Supreme Court stated that "c[i]dentit> of interest1 as used . . . means that the
parties arc so closely related m their business operations that notice of that action against one
serves as notice of the action to the other." Id. At 217. Other than being in "privity of contract,"
there was no close relationship between the original parties and those sought to be amended in.
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the summary judgment which dismissed the
complaint against the supplier and manufacturer. Id. At 217.
So, under Perry it is clear that a mere "privity of contract" relationship is not enough to
meet the "identity of interest" standard. But it is Porter's belief that Perry did not stand for the
proposition that parties in a "privity of contract" relationship could never meet the "identity of
interest" standard as was found by Judge Bohling.
Nunez v. Albo, 53 P. 3d 2 (Ut App 2002) appeared to resolve this issue, making it
absolutely clear that parties in "privity of contract" most definitely can have the "identity
of interest" necessary to allow relation back for amendment purposes. Even if the
relationship is one of "privity of contract," it can nevertheless be sufficiently close that
notice of the proceedings to one party would be tantamount to notice of the proceedings
to the other party. The issue is whether it can be assumed (from the closeness of the
relationship) or proven (from the specific facts in the case), that the party sought to be
amended in was "sufficiently alerted to the proceedings or [was] involved in them
unofficially from an early stage." Nunez at ^j 29 (See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d
902, 906 (Utah 1976).
In Nunez, a patient brought a medical malpractice action against her physician in
34

connection with treatment that she received for spider veins. Following the expiration of
the statute of limitations, the patient sought to amend her complaint to add the physician's
employer, the state university where the physician served as a faculty member. Id. at ^ [
1-6. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion to amend on the grounds that the
relationship between the physician and his employer was one of "privity of contract."
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her amended complaint adding the university
as a defendant related back to her original complaint because the employer-employee
relationship was close enough, and the university employer had in fact known of the
lawsuit, such that it could be presumed and in fact proven that the university had notice of
the proceedings and would not therefore be prejudiced. The Utah Court of Appeals
agreed, and overruled the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs
amended complaint related back to the date of her original complaint due to the "identity
of interest" between the physician and university. This "identity of interest" between the
physician and the university was based upon the contract of employment between the
physician and the university and the university's involvement in the proceedings
unofficially from an early stage, including providing counsel for the physician and
communications made by the university to plaintiff.
Thus, Nunez makes it clear that the closeness of relationship between the new and
old parties is the point of examination for the court; if that relationship is close enough
such that the new party was sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, whether officially or
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unofficially, from an early stage then there will be found a sufficient identity of
interest" between the new and old parties such that relation back of the amended
complaint is not prejudicial. Nunez further clarifies that parties in privity of contract can
be so closely related that they have a sufficient 'identity of interest" so as to allow
relation back.
Porter was thrilled, therefore, when the Court of Appeals decided Nunez and ruled
in a "privity of contract1' case there could be a sufficient identify of interest between
parties who were only in "privity of contract51 to allow an amended complaint to relate
back to the date of the filing of the original complaint therein.
Porter was also thrilled when Floyd Cox, appearing as president of Fox Construction at
an examination at Porter's counseFs office on September 5, 2002, testified about the closeness of
the relationship between bond companies - surety companies ~ and contractors in general, and
the specific relationship between Fox and National. After testifying that Fox would submit
formal, audited fmancials to National at least once each year, Cox testified as follows:
"Q.(By Mr. Steffensen) And that was as your counsel indicated, you supplied that
[(fmancials)] yearly as a condition?
A. (Cox) Yes.
Q. Did you have any obligations in connection with your agreements with the bond
company to notify them if there was any change in condition during the course of a year, such as
that the fmancials submitted previously would not be accurate?
A. i would meet with the bonding agents and representatives of the [Fireman's bond]
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companies at least two or three times a year, and they were very well aware of the financial
situation during the year, what was happening with Fox Construction.
Mr. Steffensen: And I assume that's because counsel probably would agree that my
observation of the relationship between a contractor and a bonding company is one of
almost economic carnal knowledge of one another. Would you agree with that, counsel?
Mr. Price [counsel for Fox]: I've never heard it quite described that way.
The Witness [Floyd Cox]: I think that describes it well.
Q. (Mr. Steffensen) Does that describe it well?
A. Yes.
Q. I mean, they expect to "know" you in the Biblical sense as to your financial
condition?
A. Let's put it this way: They pretty much knew when I cut my fingernails, yes.
Q. Okay. And then did you have obligations to keep them informed as to what was
happening on the jobs, claims and things?
A. Absolutely, yes. And it was their obligation to check, and check with the owners. It
was typical procedure for them.
Q. And that's what you did on all of the projects you had during your relationship with
National Surety?
A. That's correct."

(Transcript of Supp. Order Examination of Floyd Cox, Sept. 5,

2002; 10:1 - 11:17). {Porter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief From Summary
Judgment Granted in Favor of National Surety Corporation, R. 965
Fox admitted, with National's attorney present, that the relationship between Fox and
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National was one of "economic carnal knowledge," that National "kneV* Fox m the Biblical
sense as to Fox' financial condition, that National kne\A when Cox/Fox "cut [his] fingernails,"
that Fox had an obligation to keep National mfonned of "claims and things" on the jobs, and that
National had an "obligation to check [for claims/problems on thejobs], and check with the
owners. It was typical procedure for [National]." The relationship between Fox and National
was an economic/financial "marriage." National had as much notice and/or control over Fox as
does a parent corporation over a subsidiary, or a subsidiary corporation over a sister subsidiary
corporation. One cannot imagine a more close "economic relationship" than this. It is certainly
as close, if not closer, than the employee/employer relationship which Nunez found sufficient to
allow relation back. Based upon these admissions, and the commonly known practices in the
construction industry, this Court should rule as a matter of law that the contractor/principal and
surety relationship is always sufficiently close to meet the "identity of interest'1 standard with
respect to bond claims. Under the description of the relationship described by Cox above, notice
of claims is contractually required to be given by the principal/contractor. Further, National had
a pattern and practice of independently monitoring the status of claims on a job, and to check
with the owner (in this case, the State of Utah) to learn about claims. From these facts, it can be
presumed that notice to Fox and the State of Utah was notice to National. At the very least there
are critical factual issues here which should have precluded granting summary judgment.
Porter argued in its motion for relief based upon the Nunez case, and this new
evidence that the relationship between Fox and National was exactly the type where there
should be found an Identity of Interest, that the summary judgment in favor of National
should be set side. Judge Bohling summarily rejected these arguments, ruling again that
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since there was a "privity of contract' relationship between Fox and National, there was
still an insufficient identity of interest.
Porter believes that these rulings by Judge Bohling were clearly erroneous especially in light of the recent decision in Penrose v. Ross,

71 P.3d 631 (Ut App. 2003).

Although an identity of interest was not found in that case, the Court's discussion of the
analysis to be followed in detennining if there is an identity of interest is very instmctive:
"Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs the relation back of
amendments, stating: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading." I d
Rule 15(c) further "allows a plaintiff to cure defects in his or her original
complaint despite the intervening running of a statute of limitations."
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995). Generally,
however, rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or
adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original
pleadings. . . . There is an exception to this rule. The exception operates
where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new
and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or
proved the relation back is not prejudicial. The rationale underpinning
this exception is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of
limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim. Doxey-Layton Co. v.
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added); see also Vina v.
Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y., 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct.App. 1988)
(applying identity of interest rule laid out in Doxey-Layton). "An identity
of interest exists "when "the real parties in interest were sufficiently
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from
an early stage.'"" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247>, ffif 29, <53 P.3d 2>
(quoting Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, ffif 14, 977 P.2d 497
(quoting Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 906)), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah
2002).

39

Having determined that the present case is not a misnomer case, we next
determine whether a true identity of interest exists, permitting the
amended complain! to relate hack. If an identity of interest is established,
a party general])7 cannot be prejudiced. See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548
P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (stating amendment permitted "where there is a
relation back, . . . when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it
can be assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial"); Vina v.
Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct.App. 1988)
(same).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "identity" as "|t]he identical nature of
two or more things." Black's Law Dictionary 748 (7th ed. 1999). Webster's
defines identity as Page 636 "sameness of essential or generic character
in different instances" and "the condition of being the same with
something described or asserted." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 597 (1986). Therefore, an identity of interest requires parties
to have the "same" interest. This definition is supported by the Utah
Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d
1277, 1294 (1937). In Pomeroy, the issue before the court was whether a
final judgment as to one issue in a case with multiple parties was effective
as to all parties for the purpose of an appeal.[fn4] See id. at 1294. The court
applied the "identity of interest" test, which it defined as "whether the
determination of the issues as to any defendant depends on or affects
the determination of the issues as to the other defendants. n [fn5] IcL
Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, this court
determined that an identity of interest existed between an employer and an
employee, permit an amendment to the complaint adding the employer as a
party to the complaint. In Nunez, a malpractice action was filed against a
physician alleging damages caused by the physician's performance of a
medical treatment. See id. at ^ 5. Nunez filed a motion to amend the
complaint to name the physician's employer, the University of Utah
Hospital (Hospital), as a defendant. See id. at ^flffl 5-6. The trial court
denied Nunez's motion and she appealed. See id. at *[fl] 6. In determining
whether the amended complaint related back to the original complaint, this
court analyzed rule 15(c) and cases outlining the exception permitting the
addition of parties where an identity of interest is established. See id. at ^f
29.
We held that an identity of interest existed between the Hospital and
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the physician because the cause of action ""arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading/" Id.
(quoting Utah R.Civ.P. 15(c)). This court also noted that the Hospital
had potential vicarious liability as the employer of the physician. See id.
atfflnffl27-34. Further, the University provided legal counsel for the
physician, asserting that the physician was acting within the scope of his
employment by the Hospital and was entitled to the protections of the
Governmental Immunity Act.[fn6] See id.
In Nunez, any disposition of the case against the physician would
necessarily affect the Hospitals liability. Thus, an identity of interest
existed because the legal position and defenses of the two parties were
the "same."
The legal positions and defenses of Fox and National in this case are likewise the
"same." They are co-obligors with Fox. If Fox is found liable to Porter, then National is
liable to Porter. The interests of a principal and surety on all construction jobs - with
respect to bond claims, are always identical. With respect to payment lawsuits, they
always have an identity of interest.
The Discovery Rule Tolled the Payment Bond Statute of Limitations.
In addition to Rule 15 permitting Porter's Amended Complaint to relate back to the
date of the original Complaint, Porter asserted that the statute of limitations on Porter's
Payment Bond claim was tolled pursuant to the discovery rale. The discovery rale is a
judicially created doctrine which functions as an exception to the normal application of a
statue of limitations. Under the discovery rale, "the statute of limitation does not begin to
run until the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action." Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d
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1282, 1284 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has enumerated three situations in
which the application of the discover) rule is appropriate: (1) where the application of the
rule is mandated by statute; (2) where the plaintiff is unaware of a cause of action because
of the defendant's misleading conduct or concealment; and (3) where application is
warranted by the existence of special circumstances that would, based on a balancing test,
render application of the statue of limitations unjust or irrational. Id. at 1285. In the
instant case, the discovery rule should toll the one year statute of limitation on Porter's
Payment Bond cause of action due to Fox's concealment of information pertinent to the
existence of its Payment Bond, and the existence of special circumstances rendering the
statute of limitations unjust and irrational.
a.

Fox/National Concealed the Payment Bond Information from
Porter.

In order to toll the statute of limitations under the concealment prong of the
discovery rale, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that the defendant actively
concealed the existence of a cause of action, and that given defendant's actions, a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier. See, Berenda v.
Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996); Horn v. Utah Dept. of Public Safety, 962 P.2d
95, 102 (Utah App. 1998). In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "weighing
the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct in light of the defendant's steps to conceal
the cause of action necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary
judgment in all but the clearest of cases." Berenda, at 54. Furthermore, it has held that
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when an agency or privity relationship exists between the third party concealing the cause
of action and another defendant, the concealment can be imputed to the defendant if the
agent acts in whole or in part to cany out the purposes of the principal. Hodges v. Gibson
Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991).
In the instant case, the undisputed facts show that Fox actively concealed the
existence of the Payment Bond and identity of its surety such that Porter could not have
reasonably discovered the claim earlier. Or, at the very least a genuine issue of material
fact exists regarding Fox's concealment. The undisputed material facts also
demonstrate a relationship between Fox and National such that Fox's conduct in
concealing the Payment Bond information should be imputed to National. As such,
National's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied.
Porter's last work was performed on May 16, 1999. Porter and Fox attempted to
negotiate the settlement of their payment disputes. Ultimately, these settlement
negotiations broke down in the spring of 1999. Thereafter, Gary Porter spoke with Fox's
Project Manager, Jeff Wood and requested that Fox provide Porter with Fox's Payment
Bond infomiation. Jeff Wood refused to provide Porter with any infomiation relating to
the Payment Bond, including whether such bond even existed. As a result of Fox's
refusal, Porter sent a letter to the owner of the Project on April 23, 1999. Pursuant to the
letter, Porter sought infomiation relating to Fox's Payment Bond in order to make a claim.
This letter was also sent to Fox. That very same day, Tom Christensen (Utah State
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Employee) sent an e-mail to Jill Jones of AJC Architects acknowledging that he had
received the letter from Porter and requested that she discuss this matter with Fox before
the University released the Payment Bond information. Neither the owner nor Fox
provided Porter with information relating to the Payment Bond following Porter's written
request. Thereafter and due to their failure to provide the information requested, Mark
Porter had a discussion with Jeff Wood in May of 1999, wherein another demand was
made that Fox provide its Payment Bond information. Again, Jeff Wood refused to
provide the information. Porter's attorney also attempted unsuccessfully to get the
Payment Bond information.
Due to Fox's concealment of the existence of a Payment Bond, Porter wras
unaware of the facts forming the basis for a cause of action upon the Payment Bond.
Therefore, Porter filed this instant action against Fox on March 16, 2001. On or about
May 31, 2000, Fox further attempted to conceal the existence of the Payment Bond by
indicating in its Rule 26 Initial Disclosures that there were no insurance agreements at
issue in the case. Then, following the expiration of the statute of limitations governing
claims upon payment bonds, Fox finally provided Porter with a copy of the Payment
Bond. This was the first time Porter discovered the facts necessary to form the basis of
his cause of action against Surety upon the Payment Bond. Porter then obtained leave
from the Court to amend its Complaint to assert its claim upon the Payment Bond.
These facts are sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Fox took affirmative
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steps to conceal the existence of a cause of action upon the Payment Bond. Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-56-38(1) provides that when a construction contract is awarded
under Utah's Procurement Code, the contractor [Fox] to whom the contract is awarded
shall deliver a payment bond to the state that is in an amount equal to 100% of the price
specified in the contract and is executed by a surety company authorized to do business in
Utah, which is for the protection of each person supplying labor, equipment, or material
for the performance of the work provided for in the contract. Additionally, the statute
permits the waiver of a Payment Bond by the state. Thus, the first element necessary to
maintain a cause of action upon a Payment Bond, is the existence of a Payment Bond.
Due to Fox's active concealment, Porter was unable to discover the existence of Fox's
Payment Bond until after it filed suit against Fox in March of 2000, still within one year
of last time labor, equipment or materials were supplied to the Project. Even after Porter
filed suit, Fox continued to conceal the existence of the Payment Bond until after the
statute of limitations had expired. Upon receipt of the Payment Bond information, Porter
finally had facts forming the basis of its cause of action and obtained leave to amend its
complaint to allege a cause of action upon the Payment Bond.
Furthermore, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Fox's conduct of concealing
the information should be imputed to National. Fox and National bound themselves to
the University of Utah such that they were both jointly and severally liable to all
claimants supplying labor or materials provided for under Fox's contract with the
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University of Utah. Furthermore. Fox's conduct was at least in part, clearJy furthering the
purposes of National by reducing the potential number of claims it could be jointly and
severally liable upon under the Payment Bond. As a result of this relationship, Fox's
concealment of the existence of the Payment Bond and the identity of National should be
imputed to National. Thus, the one year statute of limitations should have been tolled and
Porter's claim upon the Payment Bond should be permitted or at the very least a genuine
issue of material fact is present which should have prevented the Court from detemiining
the date the statute of limitations began to ran. In either event, National's motion should
have been denied.
b.

Special Circumstances Exist Rendering the Statute of
Limitations Unjust and Irrational.

Similar to the rational in preventing one party from escaping liability due to
a party's conduct of concealing facts necessary to form the basis of a cause of action, the
discovery rule will toll the statute of limitations when special circumstances exist
rendering the statute unjust and irrational regardless of any showing that the defendant
has prevented discovery of the cause of action. Porter asserts that the material facts
demonstrate that under the circumstances, application of the statute of limitations is
unjust and irrational.
"The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances
that render the application of a statute of limitations irrational or unjust [turns on] a
balancing test.'* Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 776 (Utah App. 1998); quoting
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Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995)(citations omitted). In this
balancing test, the Court must weigh the hardship imposed on the claimant by the
application of the statute of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the passage of time. Id. Some factors the court considers in applying this balancing
test include: (1) whether the defendant's problems caused by the passage of time are
greater than the plaintiffs; (2) whether the defendant performed a technical service that
the plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate; and (3) whether the claim
has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the
parties cannot remember basic events. Sevy at 636. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court
has held that before reaching this balancing test "the plaintiff must first show that the
plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the
cause of action in time to file a claim within the limitation period." Id. citing Warren v.
Provo City Corp. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). This latter issue of plaintiff s
discovery is a question of fact. Sevy at 634.
As demonstrated above, in order to maintain an action upon a Payment Bond, such
a bond must have been issued. In the instant case, the material facts demonstrate that
Porter did not know whether Fox had obtained a Payment Bond until after June 29, 2000,
approximately one and one half months after the statute of limitations had expired. The
material facts further demonstrate that Porter made reasonable attempts to discover the
existence of the Payment Bond from both Fox and the owner of the Project prior to the
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expiration of the statute of limitations but that Fox willfully concealed the Payment Bond
information from Porter. As such, Porter filed the instant action against Fox in March of
2000 and sought to discover the Payment Bond information through the initial disclosure
phase of discovery. Even after Porter filed the instant action, Fox continued in its efforts
to conceal the payment Bond information by stating that no insurance agreements were
applicable to this case. Thereafter, Fox finally disclosed the Payment Bond information
after the statute of limitations had run. Upon discovery that Fox had obtained a Payment
Bond, Porter amended its Complaint to assert a cause of action thereon.
Based upon these material facts, Porter did not discover the facts forming the basis
of its cause of action until Fox came clean on or about June 29, 2000. after the statute of
limitations had run. If the applicable statute of limitations continues to be imposed,
Porter will be precluded from obtaining redress from the party who insured that Fox
would pay for all labor and materials provided to the Project. Porter has a judgment
against Fox, but Fox can't pay. This unjust application of the statute of limitations would
allow Fox and National to reap the benefits of Fox's willful concealment and open the
door to future similar conduct. Such conduct is against public policy and should not be
condoned by the Court. The substantial hardship to Porter and public policy clearly
outweigh any prejudice, if any, National might claim to have experienced.
National's Attorney Should Have Been Required to Allocate Their Fees
Between Fox and National. Following service of Porter's Amended Complaint upon
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National, the law firm of Babcock, Bostwick, Scott, Crawley & Price ("Babcock")
entered its appearance on behalf of National. Babcock had already been in the case
representing Defendant Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") for over an entire year prior.
When National filed its motion for attorney's fees, Babcock failed to separately allocate
the time spent on its defense of National and Fox and sought through National's motion,
to recover its attorney's fees for its unsuccessful defense of Fox. Additionally, an
analysis of Babcock's invoice submitted in support of Mr. Price's Affidavit of Attorney's
Fees demonstrates that National's motion sought to recover for attorney's fees billed by
Babcock for work that was never completed and for unreasonable and excessive hours.
Simply put, National sought to recover approximately $28,000 in attorney's fees for
answering a complaint, taking a deposition and drafting a motion for summary judgment
on a statute of limitations defense.
Porter objected, but Judge Bohling granted an award of $25,000 plus costs. Porter
still feels like this award was excessive and improper under the circumstances and as
outlines in its memorandum in opposition to the request, which is incorporated herein.
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT BY PORTER
Porter asks this Court to (a) affirm the summary judgment against Fox, (b)
authorize an award of additional attorney's fees and costs in connection with this appeal,
(c) reverse the summary judgment in favor of National and against Porter, (d) reverse the
award of attorney's fees to National, (e) in the alternative, require National's attorneys to
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allocate their fees between work for Fox and work for National, and (f) if the summary
judgment in favor of National is reversed and the summary judgment against Fox is
affirmed, to direct that judgment be entered in favor of Porter and against National for the
same amounts previously awarded to Porter, plus costs and fees.
DATED this 12th day of January, 2004.
Steffensen • Law •Office
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY PORTER CONSTRUCTION, dba
PORTER & SONS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
CASE NO. 000902201

Plaintiff,
vs.
FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC., &
NATIONAL SURETY CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Before the Court

are plaintiff's

objections

to defendant

National Surety Corporation's ("NSC") proposed Order relating to
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment which the Court granted
from

the bench

on April

29, 2002,

following

Pursuant to the Court's request, counsel

oral

argument.

for NSC drafted the

proposed Order, to which plaintiff objected.

The proposed Order

and the Objection thereto were submitted to the Court on May 9,
2002.

The Court writes independently to clarify the basis for its

decision and resolve the Objections.
According to the plaintiffs, defendant Fox Construction's
("Fox") refusal to pay began prior to January 1998, and plaintiff's
Amended Complaint asserts that the payment for the services for
which plaintiff seeks recovery was past due as of February 11,
1998.

NSC objects to this date, as it was established by

if%
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PORTER CONST.
V. FOX CONST.
modifying
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deposition

deadline allowed

testimony

which

MEMORANDUM DECISION
occurred

after

both

the

for making such modifications, and after the

filing of the present Motion for Summary Judgment.

However, the

date is not material to the decision reached in this case, and
thus, the Court adopts this date for purposes of this motion only.
Plaintiff continued work on the project until approximately
May 16, 1999.
plaintiff

(See, Amended Complaint f 15.)

filed

this

Complaint

against

On March 16, 2000,

Fox,

seeking

damages

resulting from Fox's alleged failure to pay plaintiff for work
performed on the University of Utah Women's Gymnastics facility on
the University Campus.

On January 12, 2 001, by motion, plaintiff

sought leave to amend its Complaint adding NSC as a defendant, and
adding a claim against the payment bond.

On February 28, 2001,

plaintiff's unopposed motion was granted.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38(4) provides that "(4) An action upon
a payment bond . . .

is barred if not commenced within one year

after the last day on which the claimant performed the labor or
service or supplied the equipment or material on which the claim is
based."

Based upon Fox's refusal to pay, Porter's cause of action

upon the bond could have accrued under this section as early as
February

11, 1998.

Nevertheless, in resolving all reasonable

inferences arising from the undisputed facts in favor of Porter,
the Court construes May 16, 1999, the approximate date of the

^ta^N
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completion of a 11 Porter's wo] L UII the project, as the date of
accrual for its cause of action on the payment bond.
some

liLsit

in

J "'v to

relate

the

filing

date

"Thus, absent

of

the

amended

complaint bach to the iiiing aate :i ir>. :*ri::inaj Coxnpi - i nt , or to
toll the statute of limitations, the latest date upon which Porter
could have 1 i J T :! it. 3rmplaint upon the bond is May 16, I'00 0, nine
months prior to the filing of the Met J on i i Leo ( u t. 1 Je Amended

plaintiff argues that the relation oaej. a:.:.:. * .. „~ . •.__•- '*
t'hCi

~f

'an Rules of Ci':l Procedure is applicable; and second, t.t=r

the ''discovery y^._-

.

; •

" -tute oi

limitations a_Lso

applies.
I'urririo first to the relation
estabiishect that the iiiiny ni

bach doctrine,

it is well-

n iTne.n;it'd "omplaint generally will

relate baci; to the date of the filing of the original Conip.iii_.ijt
oriJi wn^n the amendment does not add a new party.

if, however

party is added, but tno new emu "id p-.ifies arc "so closely related
in their business operations that notice of the action against . ne
strvtii:

]

provide notice of the action to the other,11 then an

exception applies, and relation bach iS - J love-1.

[i,iZ,

Wilcox

i,
<

Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996) at 369; and Perry v.
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 ^Ltah 1984; at 213,

To
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applies

here

examination of the relationship between Fox and NSC.

requires

an

The identity

of interest between these parties, as it turns out, is privity of
contract.

It is clear, as held in Perry, that such a relationship

is an insufficient identity of interest to allow for relation back.
Id.

Thus, plaintiff's action in filing the claim adding NSC as a

party does not relate back to the filing date of the original
Complaint under Rule 15.
Turning to the discovery rule, the Utah Supreme Court, in
Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1998), explained the rule
as follows:
Special situations exist in which the socalled discovery rule tolls the running of the
statute of limitations. Myers,
635 P.2d
at
86.
The discovery rule is a judicially
created doctrine under which the statute of
limitation does not begin to run until the
plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of
the facts which give rise to the cause of
action. The discovery rule functions as an
exception to the normal application of a
statute of limitation.
...[t]he discovery rule does not apply to a
plaintiff who becomes aware of his injuries or
damages and a possible cause of action before
the statute of limitations expires.
Accordingly, the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations
unless plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have learned of the facts which give rise to the cause of action,

n
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"possible11

a
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injuries
one

or

s'Latuie

expi red.
To

frame

considered:
deliver

tr.coe.

ore

both

-. .

requires

.-.avnent

,r:;je;i:

~v

contractors

peri orm. no

5 - c pertrrmanee

state, Utah Coae Ann.

ooods

zr

need

state

to

be

wor): to

security

::

:; .

the o1 her provides that

"any

person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond

upon

payment of the cost rf

Utah

Code

Ann.,

plaintiff

S

;> I.U-M-I-JC;

^"^Lies

reproduction of the bond and postage."

€3-ob-19.

both

notice

of

Kead

togethei ,

trie likelihood

these

of

the

^v T e

statutes
existence

of

a

payment bond arid the procedure for obtaining a copy of the bond.
Plaintiff concedes that he was aware that there \J as or should
have oeen a payment

bond or

ire project as early ci Air: . 1999.

Nevertheless, ^e^u.tt- : . 1 ^ • r c c :

"'' • s-=tctorv rroceoure for

oota.nino

p:.r:r

a 1: p y

it

contractor,

nor

procedure.

Mibtectd, plaintiff

April

and May,

his

:- rone,

neitner

counsel,

1999, without

ever

availed

-.pr: _*-.>_-_ a

themselves

of

this

;

ish&1 Fcx for a copy of the bond in
success,

prior

to

cumiitenc J nu

;ii^

action, and plaintiff's counsel left phone messages in June, 1000
with a receptionist
project,
returned.

but

dropped

cu

secretary

the matter

:i

f[r

when

~ identified
the

phone

owner of

calls

the

were

not

In order to obtain a copy of the bond, plaintiff

had
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only to make a written request and include a check for an amount
sufficient to cover

copying

and postage.

The requirement

of

reasonable diligence, at a minimum, required plaintiff to at least
do as much.

In failing to do so, plaintiff may not avail itself of

the discovery rule.
The
plaintiff.

alternative

exception

is

equally

problematic

for

As described previously, plaintiff was aware of his

injuries or damages as early as February, 1998, and was aware there
should have been a bond as early as April 1999. As NSC argues,
given plaintiff's admitted suspicions, plaintiff was at least aware
of the "possibility11 if not the probability or even certainty of a
cause of action against the payment bond before the statute had run
on May 16, 2000.

Accordingly, plaintiff plainly could have pled a

cause of action against Fox on its bond or a doe surety company to
avoid the running of the statute even without a copy of the bond in
hand.

Plaintiff did not do so. Even after receiving actual notice

of the payment bond, plaintiff waited eight months before filing
its Amended Complaint adding NSC as a party.
It is undisputed that by May 16, 1999 plaintiff was aware of
his injuries or damages, and equally plain that plaintiff was aware
of a possible cause of action upon the payment bond prior to the
May 16, 2000 statute of limitation deadline.

Accordingly the

discovery rule does not apply.

I^W
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For the i oregoijiy reasons , p] a intif f ' s claim, against NSC is
barred under m e

s t a u t e cr j .iri.tatiuns such that .n'S. . ..- -_:.t-: .-a

to i^oco-r~~ '

~atter rf "."-v.*.

'

In view ci these determinations.

IT IS HEREBY Q R D L r ^ , ^.It:^!.: VKZ : - - " " - ? . m a t rne Morion of
defendant NSC for Sur.r^ry Judgment, under
Rule.
all

.

'

claims

and

r^ie

causes

of

:._;__:. i ^ ^ ^ e

Amended

Complaint

"tiff
snail

dismissed in their ent'retv f with prejudice.
Order of the Court

no and

against

are

I f>

Cc-

hereby

This constitutes the

on the mat Lei s referenced

herf;n.

further Order need be prepared.
Dated :..-

' ta'i

""--.-eaure shsii r-~ and is hereby granted, and tr.st

defendant N.c 7 . n r:c

final

16(c) of thv

- •' ."..".y, 2002.

WILLIAM B. BOHLING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

J
nxf

I
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order,

to the following, this

1$ day of July, 2002:

Brian C. Steffensen
Damian E. Davenport
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Jeffrey R. Price
Michael E. Bostwick
Attorneys for Defendant
57 W. South Temple, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

n&p*^

Addendum B

Order Deriving Motion for Relief From
National's Summary Judgment

\MlPi G 6 0 .
Jeffery R. Price (6315)
Michael E. Bostwick (7037)
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
One Thirty Nine East
South Temple St., Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 961-7400
Facsimile: (801) 961-7406
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Bird Judicial District

___

c^/^AL_
Deputy Gsark

Attorneys for Defendants Fox Construction, Inc. and National Surety Corp.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARY PORTER CONSTRUCTION, dba
PORTER & SONS,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

Civil No. 000902201
Judge William B. Bohling

vs.

FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC., and NATIONAL
SURETY CORP.,
Defendants.

ENTERED IN r.iiC.oTf.Y
OFJUDGMENTS
JUDGMENTS
DATE.

Plaintiffs, Gary Porter Construction, dba Porter & Sons ("Porter"), Motion for Relief from Summary
Judgment Granted in Favor of Defendant National Surety Corporation ("Motion") came on for hearing on
the 22nd day of October, 2002, at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling,
Judge of the Third District Court. Defendants were represented by their attorneys of record Jeffery R. Price
and Michael E. Bostwick of BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. Plaintiff Porter was represented by its attorneys
of record Brian W. Stefffensen and Damian E. Davenport of STEFFENSEN LAW OFFICE. The court

000902201^°™"^

JD

\-\fefi

having heard argument of counsel on the issues, and having reviewed the file, makes and enters the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The case of Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App. 247, is not controlling in this situation. The relationship
between National and Fox Construction lacks the necessary identity of interest in order for the Rule 15
relation-back doctrine to apply. As such, Porter's Motion is denied.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 mid Dixie State Bankv. Bracken, 764P.2d 985 (Utah 1988),
National is awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $25,000.00. As a matter of law7, there is
nothing in the Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees which is false. Utah law is states that no apportionment is
necessary when the facts are inextricably intertwined. The facts in this case are inextricably intertwined in
this case, therefore, no apportionment is necessaiy between Fox Construction and National Surety
Corporation ("National"). It was the role of the surety, National, was required to defend the action when
Fox could not.
hi summary, National is awarded a judgment against Plaintiff Porter in the amount of:
$25,000.00

Attorneys' fees and costs

together with post-judgment interest at the legal rate as provided from the date of the judgment until paid,
plus after-accruing costs, and attorneys' fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or
otherwise.
DATED this ci_ day o f p f W - - *

, 2002,.

Judge William B. Bo?

